Biosecurity in Small-Scale US Livestock Operations
Animal health is closely related to profitability, since healthy animals are more productive and introduction of disease to a naïve herd or flock can have negative economic consequences. This factsheet from the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service looks at practices and methods that small-scale livestock farmers can use to minimise the risk associated with poor biosecurity.Biosecurity is a system of practices designed to
reduce the risk of introducing disease to an operation
and prevent disease spread among animals. Because
disease transmission to even one animal can affect the
health of animals on the entire operation, biosecurity
practices are an important part of the health
management plan of all operations.
Ideally, operations
should work with a veterinarian to develop practical and
cost effective biosecurity practices. Good biosecurity
practices include
- proper handling of new animals and visitors
- regular veterinary consultations
- limiting contact with outside animals
- use of animal identification, and
- knowledge of interspecies disease transmission.
The US Department of Agriculture’s National
Animal Health Monitoring System conducted the Smallscale
US Livestock Operations, 2011 study.
The study
focused on operations that raised livestock and had
gross annual sales from $10,000 to $499,999. Based on
the NASS 2007 Census of Agriculture, approximately
350,000 farms in the United States fit this definition of a
small–scale livestock operation. Livestock included
cattle, poultry, goats, sheep, swine, horses, aquaculture,
and other farm animals raised for sale or home use.
For
the study, 8,123 small–scale operations from all 50
States responded to the survey.
Multiple Livestock Species
The presence of multiple livestock species on an
operation can have implications for disease
transmission. For instance, several domestic and foreign
animal diseases can infect multiple ruminant species,
and some influenza virus strains might be transmitted
between swine and avian species. In addition, some
species can be carriers of a disease without showing
clinical signs of disease, yet can still transmit the disease
to other species.
The majority of small–scale operations (87.2 per cent)
raised beef cattle during the 12 months prior to the study
survey, and about half of operations (47.1 per cent) had
more than one type of livestock during the same time
period. The West region had a higher percentage of
operations with more than one type of livestock species
compared with operations in the other regions.
Operations in the West region commonly kept both beef
cattle and horses.
Slaughter Facilities
Some regions of the United States do not have
enough slaughter facilities to meet the needs of local
small–scale farmers (Goodsell, 2010). A mobile slaughter
unit is a self–contained slaughter facility that travels from
site to site and is an alternative to using a stationary
slaughter facility.
Mobile slaughter units, however, can
increase the risk of disease transmission between farms
or animals. For example, disease spread can occur if the
unit’s equipment is not properly decontaminated
between operations. Using mobile slaughter units can
also decrease the risk of disease spread because
animals processed in these facilities do not go to market
and are, therefore, not exposing other animals before
being slaughtered.
Overall, 5.8 per cent of operations used a mobile
slaughter service for livestock or poultry and 38.9
per cent had live animals transported to a slaughter
facility. A higher percentage of operations in the West
region used a mobile slaughter service (26.7 per cent)
compared with operations in the North Central,
Northeast, and South regions (6.2, 4.2, and 1.5 per cent
of operations, respectively; Figure 1). Operations that did
not use a mobile slaughter service or transport animals
to slaughter might have sold animals through an auction
instead.
Movement and Quarantine
The addition of new animals to an operation is a
potential route for disease introduction. In addition,
animals that leave the operation and then return may
have had contact with other animals, which presents the
risk of introducing new disease. Proper quarantine of
new or returning animals can prevent the introduction of
acute infectious diseases to the herd or flock.
During quarantine, animals should be kept separate
from the remainder of the herd or flock and be observed
regularly for disease symptoms or fever. Separate
equipment and clothing should be used when caring for
quarantined animals. Operators should care for the
established animals first and care for the new or
returning (quarantined) animals last. Some diseases that
do not manifest acute clinical signs, such as Johne’s
disease in cattle, cannot be effectively prevented by
temporary quarantine. For these diseases, laboratory
testing or other techniques can be utilized to help
prevent disease introduction.
Overall, about four out of 10 operations (39.3 per cent)
brought new livestock or poultry onto the operation
during the 12 months prior to the study, and 13.9 per cent
of operations had livestock or poultry move off the
operation and return during the same time period. The
percentage of operations that brought new livestock or poultry onto the operation increased as farm sales
increased, ranging from 37.4 per cent of low–sales
operations to 68.3 per cent of high–sales operations.
High–sales operations were also more likely to have had
livestock or poultry move off the operation and return
(22.3 per cent) than low–sales operations (13.5 per cent).
Overall, 40.3 per cent of operations that brought on
new animals or had animals leave and return always
quarantined the new or returning animals but almost
half of operations (48.0 per cent) rarely or never
quarantined new or returning animals (Figure 2).
(For operations that brought on new livestock or poultry or that had animals leave the operation and return during the previous 12 months)
A quarantine period of at least 21 to 30 days for new or returning animals is recommended for most livestock species. Operations that always quarantined new or returning animals during the previous 12 months kept the animals quarantined for a longer period (25.3 days, on average) than operations that sometimes quarantined new or returning animals (17.5 days, on average).
Barriers to Implementing Quarantine
As mentioned previously, about half of operations
that added animals or had animals leave the operation
and return rarely or never quarantined the new or
returning animals, even though the introduction of
disease can be very costly.
Operators were asked to
provide the reasons for not quarantining animals. For
operations that sometimes quarantined new or
returning animals, inadequate labour or time was cited
as a reason for not always quarantining animals by 18.1
per cent of operations. Trusting the source of the new
animals or the place from which animals returned was
given as a reason for not quarantining animals by 67.5 per cent of these operations (see table), and lack
of a separate enclosure or extra equipment was a
reason for not quarantining on 29.5 per cent of
operations.
About one of 10 operations that rarely or never
quarantined new or returning animals (11.4 per cent)
had ‘other’ reasons for not isolating animals. The most
commonly cited ‘other’ reasons were all-in-all-out
production and the belief that isolation was not
necessary for their circumstances.
All-in-all-out production refers to a management
practice in which all animals are removed from the
operation, barn, room or pen before new animals are
brought in. The practice is common in poultry and swine
production. All-in-all-out production is an effective
biosecurity measure for preventing disease spread,
especially when barns and equipment are cleaned and
disinfected before new animals are introduced.
Interestingly, fewer than six per cent of respondents
believed that isolation is not beneficial but some
respondents felt that it did not apply to their situation.
Percentage of operations, by reason, that animals were not quarantined (for operations that sometimes, rarely or never quarantined new or returning livestock or poultry during the previous 12 months) |
||
---|---|---|
Reason | Sometimes | Rarely or never |
Do not have a separate enclosure or extra equipment for isolating animals | 29.5 | 27.9 |
Trust the source of the new animals or the place from which the animals are returning | 67.5 | 64.8 |
Have inadequate labour or time to implement isolation | 18.1 | 9.0 |
Do not believe isolation is beneficial or prevents disease | 4.1 | 5.7 |
Other | 5.6 | 11.4 |
Contact with Other Animals
Exposing animals to livestock from other operations
in a commingled pasture or through fence-line contact
are other routes for introducing disease to a herd or
flock.
Overall, only 8.4 per cent of operations had
livestock or poultry share a pasture at the same time
with livestock or poultry from another operation during
the previous 12 months. The percentage was higher in
the West region (22.4 per cent of operations) than in the
North Central, Northeast, and South regions (8.8, 5.1,
and 5.8 per cent, respectively).
Having a perimeter fence and preventing fence-line
contact with livestock from other operations reduces the risk of introducing infectious diseases. Overall, about
half of operations (51.8 per cent) had a perimeter fence
and no fence-line contact between their livestock and
livestock from other operations. Fence-line contact with
other livestock is not always preventable. Although a
second fence can be constructed to prevent fence-line
contact with neighbours’ animals, it can be very
expensive.
Fencing is a more important biosecurity feature for
some livestock species than for others. For example,
swine and poultry operations often use a barn rather
than fencing as a barrier for keeping out other animals.
Barns are more effective than fences for preventing
wildlife and outside animal access. Additionally, fencing
is not relevant to biosecurity on some operations with
‘other’ livestock species, such as aquaculture or bees.
Access to a Veterinarian
Veterinarians, as resources for animal health, play
an important role in the productivity of small–scale
operations and the safety of the US food supply. However, there might be a shortage of food-animal
veterinarians in some rural areas. To address this issue,
in 2010, the USDA implemented a plan which offered to
repay the student loans of veterinarians who practice in
under–served areas.
During the study, operators were asked about the
distance to the nearest veterinarian that worked with
their type of livestock, regardless of whether or not the
operation actually used that veterinarian. Overall, 82.0
per cent of operations had a veterinarian that worked with
their type of livestock available within 29 miles of the
operation. In the West region, about one of four
operations (24.2 per cent) was located 30 to 99 miles
from the nearest veterinarian that worked with their type
of livestock. For 0.9 per cent of operations, no
veterinarian was available or the nearest veterinarian
was 300 or more miles away from the operation.
Considering that there are about 350,000 small–scale
livestock operations in the United States (NASS 2007
Census of Agriculture), this means that about 3,150
operations (0.9 per cent × 350,000) either have no
access to a livestock veterinarian or would have to travel
300 or more miles to reach one. Of operations that
reported no veterinarian was available for their type of
livestock, about 25 per cent raised ‘other’ livestock
species such as aquaculture, fur-bearing animals or
bees.
About seven of 10 operations in the North Central and
West regions (72.8 and 71.2 per cent, respectively) had
used a veterinarian for their livestock or poultry during
the previous 12 months, compared with fewer than six of
10 operations in the Northeast and South regions (59.0
and 54.8 per cent, respectively). Overall, 62.0 per cent of
operations had used a veterinarian during the previous
12 months.
Producers who did not use a veterinarian
were asked why. Of the 38.0 per cent of operations that
did not use a veterinarian, only 12.4 per cent did not use
a veterinarian because it was too expensive. About two
of three operations (65.8 per cent) did not use a veterinarian because there was “no disease or other
need for a veterinarian,” and 44.2 per cent did not use a
veterinarian because the operator provided the animals’
health care.
Contacts in the Event of a Disease Outbreak
If a foreign animal disease outbreak, such as foot and
mouth disease, were to occur in the United States,
early detection would be critical in mitigating the effects
of the outbreak.
Ensuring that the people most likely to
be contacted in the event of an outbreak are aware of
the appropriate procedures for reporting a potential
outbreak will help speed diagnosis and response.
Most
operations (85.1 per cent) would be very likely to contact
a private veterinarian directly if they had an animal they
suspected of having a foreign animal disease. This
finding is consistent with findings from previous NAHMS
studies on individual commodities (USDA, 2008, 2009).
Information and Training Needs
Operators of small–scale operations are a diverse
group with varying levels of experience in farming. Many
operators have spent a lifetime farming or ranching,
while others are relatively new to the business. Based on
research by the Economic Research Service in 2007,
about 22 per cent of all US farms were operated by
producers who had been in farming for 10 years or less
(ERS, 2009). Federal agencies and universities provide
relevant training and informational resources to assist
small–scale operations.
During this study, topics in which small–scale
operators wanted more training, as well as their
preferences for receiving that training, were identified.
The highest percentage of operations deemed training
on animal health/diseases and how to transfer the farm
to the next generation very useful (41.0 and 40.9 per cent
of operations, respectively). The highest percentage of
operations preferred to get their training through the
local extension office (56.0 per cent) or via written
publication (49.4 per cent).
Summary
Practising good biosecurity is an important part of
animal health management and can reduce the risk of
disease introduction and disease spread. About half of
small–scale operations had multiple species present,
which can have implications for disease transmission
and, therefore, increases the need for good biosecurity
practices.
Quarantine is an important biosecurity practice.
About half the operations rarely or never quarantined
new animals or animals that left the farm and returned.
In the West region, mobile slaughter services were
used by about one of four operations. Depending on the
biosecurity practices implemented by the providers of
this service, use of mobile slaughter services could
increase or decrease the risk of disease spread among
operations.
Veterinarians play an important role in the
productivity of small–scale operations. Many operations
had not used a veterinarian during the previous 12
months. Some of these operations provided their own
health care for livestock. In the event of a suspected or
actual foreign animal disease outbreak, however, the
majority of operations said they were very likely to
contact a private veterinarian directly.
References
Ahearn M. and Newton D. 2009. Beginning Farmers and Ranchers. Economic Research Service. Economic
Information Bulletin 53.
Goodsell M. and Stanton T. 2010. A resource guide to direct marketing livestock and poultry. March 2010.
USDA, 2008. Dairy 2007, Part III: Reference of Dairy Cattle Health and Management Practices in the United States, 2007. CEAH–NAHMS, Fort Collins, CO, #N482.0908.
USDA, 2009. Beef 2007–08, Part II: Reference of Beef Cow-calf Management Practices in the United States, 2007–08. CEAH–NAHMS, Fort Collins, CO, #N512.0209.
June 2012